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Abstract
We characterize those identities and independencies which hold for all prob-
ability functions on a unary language satisfying the Principle of Atom Ex-
changeability. We then show that if this is strengthen to the requirement
that Johnson’s Sufficientness Principle holds, thus giving Carnap’s Contin-
uum of inductive methods for languages with at least two predicates, then
new and somewhat inexplicable identities and independencies emerge, the
latter even in the case of Carnap’s Continuum for the language with just a
single predicate.
Keywords: Carnap’s Continuum, Atom Exchangeability, Stochastic
Independence, Inductive Logic.
Introduction
To this day the Continuum of Inductive Methods described by Carnap in
[1], [2], [3], [4] continues to be adapted and promoted as paradigm solutions
to various problems within Inductive Logic. For example arithmetic com-
binations of these functions figure almost exclusively in recent attempts to
provide probability functions exhibiting certain specific features of analogical
influence, see [5], [11], [12], [15], [16].
There seem to be several good reasons for this focus. Firstly this Continuum
has a widely acceptable justification in terms of its ‘rationality’: There is a
putatively rational requirement, namely Johnson’s Sufficientness Principle,
that we can impose on an inductive method (i.e. probability function) which
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forces it to be precisely a member of Carnap’s Continuum (see also Johnson’s
earlier derivation of this in [9]), at least when we assume that the language
has more than one predicate. Secondly the Continuum has a simple form,
making it easy to work with, whilst the parameter it involves has a clear
interpretation which readily permits generalizations.
Carnap’s original goal in his Inductive Logic programme was to develop an
inductive method which could be applied to real world problems of induction,
or more generally the assignment of probabilities based on some finite body of
evidence, and which furthermore was logical in the sense that it’s conclusions
followed mechanically from the evidence via certain precisely formulated rules
or principles. The arrival on the scene of Goodman’s Grue Paradox, [6], [7],
however highlighted an evident flaw in the practicality of the approach; that in
real (as opposed to toy) examples there is usually so much available evidence
that even if it could be suitably formulated in the language of the problem
it would be completely infeasible to take it as one’s premise set.
Whilst many philosophers have seen this as the end of the programme as a
practical, rather than simply a theoretical, project, nevertheless apparently
similar aspirations to Carnap’s still seem to underlie papers such as those on
analogical reasoning cited above. One explanation for this is that whilst all
our available knowledge in an real world situation is just too much to handle
nevertheless most of it should be redundant or irrelevant and possibly what
really does matter can be simply formulated. This raises the question we shall
consider in this paper, to what extent is this a reasonable assumption for the
members of Carnap’s Continuum, more precisely under what circumstances
is a sentence θ stochastically independent of a sentence φ for all members of
Carnap’s Continuum?
Before that however we need to spend a little time introducing some standard
notation. The experienced reader might therefore be advised to skip the next
section, only referring back to it as necessary.
Notation
Let L be a predicate language with just q (unary) predicates, P1, P2, . . . , Pq,
constants a1 for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . and no other relation, constant or function
symbols. As usual the intention here is that these ai exhaust the universe.
Let α1(x), α2(x), . . . , α2n(x) denote the atoms of L, that is the 2
q formulae
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of L of the form
±P1(x) ∧ ±P2(x) ∧ . . . ,∧ ± Pq(x).
So for example the atoms in the case q = 2 are P1(x)∧P2(x), P1(x)∧¬P2(x),
¬P1(x) ∧ P2(x), ¬P1(x) ∧ ¬P2(x). Knowing which atom an ai satisfies tells
us exactly which of the Pj(x) ai does or does not satisfy, and hence tells us
everything there is to know about ai.
A state description, Θ(b1, b2, . . . , bm), for distinct choices b1, b2, . . . , bm from
the ai, is a sentence of the form
m∧
i=1
αji(bi), (1)
and similarly tells us all there is to know about b1, b2, . . . , bm.
Notice that the state descriptions for b1, b2, . . . , bm are disjoint and any quan-
tifier free sentence φ(b1, b2, . . . , bm) of L is logically equivalent to a disjunction
s∨
k=1
Θk(b1, b2, . . . , bm)
of distinct state descriptions Θk(~b) for b1, b2, . . . , bm. Hence if w is a proba-
bility function on L (for a definition see for example [8] or [14]) then
w(φ(b1, b2, . . . , bm)) =
s∑
k=1
w(Θk(b1, b2, . . . , bm)). (2)
We say that w satisfies Constant Exchangeability, Ex, if w(φ(b1, b2, . . . , bm))
depends only on φ(x1, x2, . . . , xm) and not on the (distinct) instantiating con-
stants b1, b2, . . . , bm. By (2) it is already enough that this holds for state de-
scriptions. Since all the probability functions we shall consider will satisfy Ex
our results will apply for general b1, b2, . . . , bm once proven for a1, a2, . . . , am.
The spectrum of a state description Θ(b1, . . . , bm) as in (1) is the multiset
1
n = {n1, n2, . . . , n2q }, where ni is the number of times that the atom αi(x)
appears amongst the αj1(x), αj2(x), . . . , αjm(x).
1Multisets are just like sets except that elements may be repeated.
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We say that w satisfies Atom Exchangeability, Ax, if w(Θ(b1, b2, . . . , bm) de-
pends only on the spectrum n of the state description Θ(b1, b2, . . . , bm). In
this case we shall write w(n) for w(Θ(~b)).
Finally we say that w satisfies Johnson’s Sufficientness Principle, JSP, if for
a state description Θ(b1, b2, . . . , bm) as in (1), w(αi(bm+1) |Θ(b1, b2, . . . , bm))
depends only on m and ni. It is well known that JSP implies Ax which in
turn implies Ex.
As shown originally by Johnson, [9] (and independently later by Kemeny,
see [4, section 19] and [10]) if the number of predicates, q, is at least 2 and
the probability function w satisfies JSP then w is a member of Carnap’s
Continuum of Inductive Methods. That is, w = cλ for some 0 ≤ λ ≤ ∞
where, with the above notation, cλ is the probability function satisfying Ax
such that
cλ((αi(bm+1) ∧Θ(b1, b2, . . . , bm)) = (ni + λ/2
q)
(m+ λ)
· cλ(Θ(b1, b2, . . . , bm)). (3)
The cases λ = 0,∞ here are rather exceptional and until further notice we
shall restrict ourselves to 0 < λ < ∞ when discussing the cλ (though still
referring to these as Carnap’s Continuum.)
Stochastic Independence and Ax
Let w be a probability function on L satisfying Ax. Then from (2) for
φ(a1, . . . , am) a sentence of L,
w(φ(a1, . . . , am)) =
∑
n
fφ(n)w(n),
where the n range over the possible spectra {n1, n2, . . . , n2q } with
∑2q
i=1 ni =
m and fφ(n) is the number of state descriptions in (2) with spectrum n.
Hence the stochastic independence2 of θ(a1, . . . , am) and φ(a1, . . . , am) with
respect to w, i.e.
w(θ(a1, . . . , am) ∧ φ(a1, . . . , am)) = w(θ(a1, . . . , am)) · w(φ(a1, . . . , am))
2If w(φ) 6= 0 we may replace this condition by the equivalent w(θ |φ) = w(θ) if in the
context that seems more appropriate.
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amounts to the identity,(∑
n
fθ∧φ(n)w(n)
)
=
(∑
n
fθ(n)w(n)
)
·
(∑
n
fφ(n)w(n)
)
,
equivalently,(∑
n
fθ∧φ(n)w(n)
)
·
(∑
n
f>(n)w(n)
)
=
(∑
n
fθ(n)w(n)
)
·
(∑
n
fφ(n)w(n)
)
(4)
since ∑
n
f>(n)w(n) = 1.
We can now turn (briefly as it happens) to the main question we are inter-
ested in: When does (4) hold for cλ with 0 < λ <∞ ? Given the aspirations
outlined in the first section one may hope that we should certainly have in-
dependence when θ(~a) and φ(~a) are respectively logically equivalent to sen-
tences θ′(a1, a2, . . . , ar) and φ′(ar+1, ar+2, . . . , am) which have no predicates
nor constants in common. However, as already pointed out in [8]3, this can
fail, for example for 0 < λ <∞,
cλ(P2(a3) ∧ P2(a4) |P1(a1) ∧ P1(a2)) > cλ(P2(a3) ∧ P2(a4)).
Given this observation one might rashly be inclined to quite the opposite
view, that the cλ do not satisfy any independencies such as (4) except in the
trivial cases when ±θ ≡ > or ±φ ≡ >. This is not true however in at least
two ways. Firstly the identity (4) with w = cλ is equivalent to a polynomial
identity in the variable λ which will sometimes hold for a finite set of roots
λ. We will dispense with such chance independencies by considering which
independencies of the form (4) hold for all the cλ (with 0 < λ <∞).
There is however a second way in which (4) can hold for all the cλ. For if q ≥ 2
then the f(n) will have common divisors and simply by taking disjunctions of
3On the other hand there is an argument why this inequality is desirable: Namely
the P1(a1)∧P1(a2) provides evidence that the individuals ai are similar and hence should
support the view that a3, a4 are similar, in particular positively supporting P2(a3)∧P2(a4).
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state descriptions we can construct sentences θ(a1, a2, . . . , am), φ(a1, a2, . . . , am)
such that for some constant k, with 0 < k < 1, and each n
fθ∧φ(n) = kfφ(n), fθ(n) = kf>(n).
In this case the equality (4) will of course hold for all probability functions
w satisfying Ax. For that reason we shall now temporarily break off from
the main interest of this paper and consider the question of what identities
and independencies must hold for all probability functions satisfying Ax.4 In
fact Theorem 3 below will show that the independencies described above are
exactly those which hold for all probability functions w satisfying Ax. First
though we will derive some special cases which are perhaps of independent
interest.
Proposition 1. If equation (4) holds for all probability functions w on L
satisfying Ax then either ∑
n
fθ(n)w(n)
is constant for all probability functions w satisfying Ax or∑
n
fφ(n)w(n)
is constant for all probability functions w satisfying Ax.
Proof Suppose that (4) held for every probability function w satisfying Ax
but that for two such functions w1, w2,∑
n
fθ(n)w1(n) 6=
∑
n
fθ(n)w2(n). (5)
In this case θ cannot be logically equivalent to ⊥ and by small perturbations
of w1, w2 if necessary we may assume that neither side of (5) is zero.
4It is easy to see that if we weaken Ax to Ex then the only independencies satisfied by
all probability functions satisfying Ex are those of the form w(θ ∧ φ) = w(θ) · w(φ) when
±θ ≡ > or ±φ ≡ >.
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The probability function (w1 +w2)/2 will also satisfy Ax and if according to
wi (i = 1, 2) (4) gives Ai = BiCi where
Ai =
∑
n
fθ∧φ(n)wi(n), Bi =
∑
n
fφ(n)wi(n), Ci =
∑
n
fθ(n)wi(n)
then according to (w1 + w2)/2 (4) gives
2(A1 + A2) = (B1 +B2)(C1 + C2).
If B1B2 = 0 this together with (5) gives B1 = B2 (= 0). Otherwise multiply-
ing by B1B2 and eliminating the C1, C2 gives
(A1B2 − A2B1)(B1 −B2) = 0
and again with (5) it follows that B1 = B2. In other words the second
possibility in the proposition pertains for w1 and w2.
Now if the proposition failed there would be w1, w2, w3, w4 such that∑
n
fθ(n)w1(n) 6=
∑
n
fθ(n)w2(n),
∑
n
fφ(n)w1(n) =
∑
n
fφ(n)w2(n),∑
n
fθ(n)w3(n) =
∑
n
fθ(n)w4(n),∑
n
fφ(n)w3(n) 6=
∑
n
fφ(n)w4(n),
with all such quantities non-zero. But by applying the same argument as
above for (w1 +w3)/2 and (w2 +w4)/2 we see that this is not possible. The
result follows. 
Proposition 2. With the notation of the previous proposition suppose that
for all probability functions w satisfying Ax that∑
n
fθ(n)w(n) = k (6)
for some constant k. Then for each n, fθ(n) = kf>(n).
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Proof Given reals s1, s2, . . . , s2q ≥ 0 and not all zero let w~s be the probability
function on L such that
w~s(n) = (2
q!)−1
∑
σ
sn1σ(1)s
n2
σ(2) . . . s
n2q
σ(2q)(s1 + s2 + . . .+ s2q)
−m
where σ ranges over the permutations of 1, 2, . . . , 2q. Then w~s satisfies Ax
and (6) gives that∑
n
fθ(n)(2
q!)−1
∑
σ
sn1σ(1)s
n2
σ(2) . . . s
n2q
σ(2q) = k(s1 + s2 + . . .+ s2q)
m.
Since we can take each si to be algebraically independent this is only possible
if the coefficients of sn11 s
n2
2 . . . s
n2q
2q on both sides agree, from which the result
follows. 
Theorem 3. Equation (4) holds for all probability functions w on L satisfy-
ing Ax if and only if ±θ ≡ > or ±φ ≡ > or for some constant k, 0 < k < 1,
fθ∧φ(n) = kfφ(n), fθ(n) = kf>(n) for all n (7)
or for some constant k, 0 < k < 1,
fθ∧φ(n) = kfθ(n), fφ(n) = kf>(n) for all n. (8)
Proof Assume that θ, φ are neither tautologies nor contradictions. In the
first case of Proposition 1 we may assume that∑
n
fθ(n)w(n) = k (9)
for some constant k, with 0 < k < 1, and for all probability functions w
satisfying Ax. Hence from (4),∑
n
fθ∧φ(n)w(n) = k
∑
n
fφ(n)w(n).
Now using w~s as in the proof of Proposition 2 we obtain that fθ∧φ(n) =
kfφ(n) for all n and since we already have fθ(n) = kf>(n) for all n, again by
Proposition 2 with (9), the result (7) follows.
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In the second case ∑
n
fφ(n)w(n) = k
for some constant k, with 0 < k < 1 and (8) follows analogously.
The converse is of course immediate from our earlier observations. 
We remark that by utilizing w~s with each of the si are algebraically inde-
pendent we obtain probability functions which satisfy Ax and whose only
independencies are those which all probability functions satisfying Ax must
satisfy.
Stochastic Independence and JSP
We now return again to considering those non-trivial identities
cλ(θ(~a) ∧ φ(~a)) = cλ(θ(~a)) · cλ(φ(~a))
which hold for all 0 < λ < ∞, where now ‘non-trivial’ means not holding
for all probability functions satisfying Ax. It turns out that there are many
such independencies but first we prove a negative result, recalling that m is
the number of constants mentioned in θ(~a) and φ(~a):
Theorem 4. For m ≤ 3, equation (4) holds for all probability functions cλ
in Carnap’s Continuum if and only if it holds for all probability functions w
satisfying Ax.
Proof It is enough to prove the result for m = 3. For (4) to hold for
cλ with θ(~a), φ(~a) non-contradictory requires that for f1 = fθ∧φ({1, 1, 1}),
f2 = fθ∧φ({2, 1}), f3 = fθ∧φ({3}), h1 = fθ({1, 1, 1}), g1 = fφ({1, 1, 1}),
t1 = f>({1, 1, 1}) etc.,
(f1µ
2 + f2µ(µ+ 1) + f3(µ+ 1)(µ+ 2))(t1µ
2 + t2µ(µ+ 1) + t3(µ+ 1)(µ+ 2)) =
(h1µ
2+h2µ(µ+1)+h3(µ+1)(µ+2))(g1µ
2+g2µ(µ+1)+g3(µ+1)(µ+2))
(10)
where µ = λ/2q and none of these polynomials is identically zero. Let f =
f1 + f2 + f3 etc.. Clearly if (10) is to hold for all µ then (f/h) = (g/t).
Factorizing the polynomial factors in (10) gives, say,
(f(µ+ ζ1)(µ+ ζ2))(t(µ+ δ1)(µ+ δ2)) =
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(h(µ+ γ1)(µ+ γ2))(g(µ+ β1)(µ+ β2)). (11)
There are now various possibilities:
(a) {ζ1, ζ2} = {γ1, γ2}. In this case a similar phenomenon must hold for
the β, δ and, since the polynomials µ2, µ(µ + 1), (µ + 1)(µ + 2) are
linearly independent, this gives
fθ∧φ(n) = (f/h)fθ(n), fφ(n) = (f/h)f>(n),
and so this independency holds for all probability functions satisfying
Ax.
(b) {ζ1, ζ2} = {β1, β2}. This case follows as in the previous case.
(c) Not cases (a) or (b). Notice that in this case the ζ1, ζ2, β1 etc. must
all be real since otherwise ζ1, ζ2 must be conjugates, etc. and one of
the previous cases must have held. But since t1 = 2
q(2q − 1)(2q − 2),
t2 = 3 · 2q(2q − 1), t3 = 2q,
t(µ+ δ1)(µ+ δ2) = tµ
2 + (t2 + 3t3)µ+ 2t3 = 2
q((2qµ)2 + (2qµ) + 2)
which has complex roots, so this case cannot occur and the required
result follows.

However for q ≥ 2 the situation changes once m > 3.
Proposition 5. For m > 3 and q ≥ 2 there are identities of the form (4)
which hold for all probability functions cλ in Carnap’s Continuum but fail for
some probability function w satisfying Ax.
Proof Take q = 2 and the usual atoms α1(x) = P1(x) ∧ P2(x), α2(x) =
P1(x) ∧ ¬P2(x), α3(x) = ¬P1(x) ∧ P2(x), α4(x) = ¬P1(x) ∧ ¬P2(x). In this
case one can check that
2cλ(α
2
1α
2
2) = cλ(α
2
1α2α3) + cλ(α
3
1α2), (12)
where α21α
2
2 is short for α1(a1) ∧ α1(a2) ∧ α2(a3) ∧ α2(a4) etc..
Writing ~a for a1, a2, a3, a4 let
ϕ(~a) = (P2(a2) ∧ ¬(Θ1(~a) ∨Θ2(~a))) ∨Θ3(~a) ∨Θ4(~a)
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where Θ1(~a),Θ2(~a),Θ3(~a),Θ4(~a) are respectively the state descriptions
α1(a1) ∧ α1(a2) ∧ α1(a3) ∧ α4(a4),
α1(a1) ∧ α1(a2) ∧ α2(a3) ∧ α4(a4),
α1(a1) ∧ α2(a2) ∧ α2(a3) ∧ α1(a4),
α1(a1) ∧ α2(a2) ∧ α1(a3) ∧ α2(a4).
In this case cλ(P1(a1)) = 1/2 = cλ(P1(a2)) and by counting contributing
state descriptions for ~a of a particular spectrum n we see that when n =
{ 2, 2 }, { 2, 1, 1 }, { 3, 1 }, { 4 }, { 1, 1, 1, 1 }, P1(a1) has 18, 72, 24, 2, 12 such
respectively, as does P2(a2). If we were to take ϕ(~a) = P2(a2) we would
obtain corresponding figures of 9, 36, 12, 1, 6 for P1(a1) ∧ ϕ(~a). However if
we just remove two state descriptions from P1(a2) and add two extra ones as
in the ϕ(~a) defined above the corresponding figures for ϕ(~a) and P1(a1)∧ϕ(~a)
come out to be 20, 71, 23, 12, 2 and 11, 35, 11, 6, 1.
Using (12) it now follows that
cλ(P1(a1) ∧ ϕ(~a)) = cλ(P1(a1)) · cλ(ϕ(~a)).
However we can certainly find probability functions w satisfying Ax for which
w(P1(a1) ∧ ϕ(~a)) 6= w(P1(a1)) · w(ϕ(~a)).
For example let wδ be as in the Nix-Paris Continuum, see [13], and 0 < δ < 1.
In this case for ν = (1 + 3δ)/(1− δ) and C = 4−5(1− δ)4,
wδ({ 2, 2 }) = 2C(ν2+1), wδ({ 2, 1, 1 }) = C(ν+1)2, wδ({ 3, 1 }) = C(ν3+ν+2)
wδ({ 4 }) = C(ν3 + 3), wδ({ 1, 1, 1, 1 }) = 4Cν,
and
wδ(ϕ(~a)∧P1(a1)) = C(11(2ν2+2)+35(ν+1)2+11(ν3+ν+2)+6(4ν)+(ν3+3))
which is not in general the same as
wδ(ϕ(~a)) · wδ(P1(a1)) =
2−1C(18(2ν2 + 2) + 72(ν+ 1)2 + 24(ν3 + ν+ 2) + 12(4ν) + 2(ν3 + 3)). 
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We shall delay further discussion of this example until the next section. Right
now we will consider the case when q = 1, that is when our language only has
a single predicate, P say. In this case we can show Theorem 5 also for m = 4.
When m = 5 we again return to the situation of Proposition 5, though the
same method will not adapt. That is, when we only have a single predicate
we cannot utilize a non-trivial identity of the form
cλ(ψ(~a)) = kcλ(η(~a))
for some constant k to construct θ(~a), φ(~a) such that for all 0 < λ <∞
cλ(θ(~a) ∧ φ(~a)) = cλ(θ(~a)) · cλ(φ(~a)),
whilst this identity fails for some probability function w satisfying Ax. In
more detail:
Theorem 6. Suppose that L has only a single predicate (i.e. q = 1) and
cλ(ψ(~a)) = kcλ(η(~a)) (13)
for all 0 < λ < ∞. Then fψ(n) = kfη(n) for all n and hence the identity
(13) holds for all probability functions satisfying Ax.
Proof Let x = λ/2 and set
gn(x) =
n−1∏
j=0
(x+ j),
so g0(x) = 1. Notice that
cλ(Θ(a1, . . . , am)) =
gn(x)gm−n(x)∏m−1
j=0 (j + 2x)
=
gn(x)gm−n(x)
gm(2x)
for Θ(~a) a state description having spectrum {n,m− n}.
For 0 ≤ n ≤ m,
g[m/2](x) | gn(x)gm−n(x)
where as usual [m/2] is the integer part of m/2. Let
qn(x) =
gn(x)gm−n(x)
g[m/2](x)
.
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for n ≤ m/2. By considering the values of q0(x), q1(x) . . . , q[m/2] at 0,−1,−2, . . . ,
−[m/2] + 1 it follows that these qn(x) are linearly independent.
Since for q = 1 the maximum length of a spectrum for this language is 2,
cλ(ψ(~a)) = g[m/2](x)
∑
n≤[m/2]
fψ({n,m− n})qn(x),
cλ(η(~a)) = g[m/2](x)
∑
n≤[m/2]
fη({n,m− n})qn(x).
From (13) we must have
g[m/2](x)
∑
n≤[m/2]
fψ({n,m− n})qn(x) = kg[m/2](x)
∑
n≤[m/2]
fη({n,m− n})qn(x)
so using the above linear independencies we must have
fψ({n,m− n}) = kfη({n,m− n})
for n ≤ [m/2] and the result follows. 
An alternative approach to that given in the proof of Proposition 5 does
however give a non-trivial independency for m = 5 and q = 1 as we now
show.
Proposition 7. Suppose that L has only a single predicate (i.e. q = 1).
Then there are θ(a1, . . . , a5), φ(a1, . . . , a5) such that for all 0 < λ <∞
cλ(θ(~a) ∧ φ(~a)) = cλ(θ(~a)) · cλ(φ(~a))
but this fails for some probability function w satisfying Ax.
Proof Using the notation of the proof of the previous theorem, for m = 5
g[m/2](x) = x(x+ 1)(x+ 2),
g0(x)g5(x) = x(x+ 1)(x+ 2)(x+ 3)(x+ 4), q0(x) = (x+ 3)(x+ 4),
g1(x)g4(x) = x
2(x+ 1)(x+ 2)(x+ 3), q1(x) = x(x+ 3),
g2(x)g3(x) = x
2(x+ 1)2(x+ 2), q2(x) = x(x+ 1),
13
and
2q0(x) + 10q1(x) + 20q2(x) = 8(2x+ 1)(2x+ 3),
q0(x) + 4q1(x) + 15q2(x) = 2(5x+ 6)(2x+ 1),
4q1(x) + 12q2(x) = 8x(2x+ 3),
q1(x) + 9q2(x) = 2x(5x+ 6).
Omitting mention of ~a = 〈a1, a2, a3, a4, a5〉 let Θ1,Θ2 be the two state de-
scriptions with spectrum {5}, let Φ1, . . . ,Φ10 be the 10 state descriptions with
spectrum {1, 4}, let Ψ1, . . . ,Ψ20 be the 20 state descriptions with spectrum
{2, 3} and let
φ(a1, . . . , a5) = Θ1 ∨
4∨
i=1
Φi ∨
15∨
i=1
Ψi,
θ(a1, . . . , a5) =
7∨
i=4
Φi ∨
18∨
i=7
Ψi,
ψ(a1, . . . , a5) = Φ4 ∨
15∨
i=7
Ψi.
Then φ(~a) ∧ θ(~a) ≡ ψ(~a) and
cλ(ψ(~a) |φ(~a)) = q1(x) + 9q2(x)
q0(x) + 4q1(x) + 15q2(x)
=
2x(5x+ 6)
2(5x+ 6)(2x+ 1)
,
cλ(θ(~a) | >) = 4q1(x) + 12q2(x)
2q0(x) + 10q1(x) + 20q2(x)
=
8x(2x+ 3)
8(2x+ 1)(2x+ 3)
,
so
cλ(θ(~a) ∧ φ(~a)) = cλ(θ(~a)) · cλ(φ(~a)).
However by Theorem 1 this identity is clearly not trivial in the sense of being
satisfied by all probability functions w satisfying Ax. 
Discussion
The previous sections have shown that there are in fact many ‘mysterious’
identities and independencies which hold for all the cλ in Carnap’s Contin-
uum, since, when suitably phrased the results for 0 < λ <∞ can be extended
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to include also λ = 0,∞ by a continuity argument. These are ‘mysterious’
in the sense that they do not hold for all probability functions satisfying Ax,
if they did then by Theorems 2, 3, they would be easily explained and com-
prehended. Instead their derivation must require the stronger assumption of
JSP rather than just Atom Exchangeability. However whilst the content of
Johnson’s Sufficientness Principle appears easy to grasp, and for the sake of
argument accept, this seems not at all to be the case for these mysterious
consequences. For example from the identity (12) and Atom Exchangeability
we can obtain that
cλ((P2(a1)↔ ¬P2(a2)) ∧ P2(a3) ∧ ¬P2(a4) ∧
4∧
i=1
P1(ai))
= cλ(P2(a1)∧P2(a2)∧¬P1(a4)∧¬P2(a4)∧
3∧
i=1
P1(ai)) (14)
whilst from Proposition 5 we have that
cλ(P1(a1) |ϕ(a1, a2, a3, a4)) = 1/2 = cλ(P1(a1)),
where ϕ(~a) is (the somewhat incomprehensible)
[P2(a2) ∧ ¬(P1(a3) ∧ ¬P1(a3) ∧ ¬P2(a4) ∧
2∧
i=1
(P1(ai) ∧ P2(ai))]
∨ [P2(a1) ∧ ¬P2(a2) ∧ (P2(a3)↔ ¬P2(a4)) ∧
4∧
i=1
(P1(ai)].
The immediate conclusion this leads us to then seems to be that there is much
more that is hidden and mysterious in Johnson’s Sufficientness Principle, and
in turn Carnap’s Continuum, than we might have expected. Whether or not
one can give an enlightening explanation which will dispel the fog remains
to be seen.
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